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The recent financial crises between 2007 and 2009 (GFC) revealed significant gaps and 
regulatory infrastructure and macro-economic policy of the financial system. Financial crises 
are generally unwelcome but prevalent feature in the financial market system. They generally 
cause upheaval across the financial system with impactful consequences across spheres of 
society. However in their wake lessons are learned and steps are taken with the revelations of 
the GFC have led to a beneficial revision of the financial regulatory architecture. However, 
this work will seek to present the argument that this revised regulatory architecture leaves 
room for ineffectiveness unless product regulation is properly addressed. 
 
In order to achieve this, this work will be divided in three major sections. It is considered that 
in order to accurately assess the effectiveness of corrective regulatory measures it is necessary 
to consider the specific issues that need correcting. Thus the first section of this work will be 
focused on financial crises and identifying the specific GFC peculiarities. The second section 
will tackle the issue of regulation failure; specifically its role in the GFC peculiarities and the 
attempts at rectifying such failure in the revised regulatory architecture following the GFC. 
The last section will give a review of such revised architecture and considering a role 
forproduct regulation pursuant to fully eliminating the effects of the GFC peculiarities. Given 
the vast scope of the financial system and the far reaching effects of the GFC as well 
rectification measure taken following the GFC, this work will be limited to a the financial 
market regulatory infrastructure (excluding, the insurance market)  and primarily the 
jurisdictions of the US and the European Union (EU). 
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1. FINANCIAL CRISES AND GFC 
The primary role of the financial system is to ensure the effective allocation of capital in the 
economy. It does this by ensuring the price paid for an asset has a commensurate value by 
facilitating the interplay of demand and supply for that asset. Large capital availability is 
likely to foster confidence in market activity. Such large capital availability may also cause 
lenders to increase their lending activity given confidence as a reflection of such confidence. 
A culmination of these increases the potential of prices assets inflation. However, since 
inflation inevitably leads to a drop in demand and thus prices, prices will eventually drop 
which inevitably has an adverse effect on holders of such assets, lending activity and 
borrowers who may also be holders of such assets. This results in loss of trust in prices, 
transaction counterparties and ultimately the financial system itself. Such mistrust is reflected 
in the keen desire for self-protection by market participants hence bank runs. These issues 
have been reflected in past financial crises.  
 
In 1907 the Unites States America (US) experienced a financial crisisas a result of market 
failure due to ‘speculation, bank runs and links across players’1. In the 1930, again in the US, 
market failure occurred but as a result of ‘huge macroeconomic shock [which] caused large 
losses at banks nationwide’2. After a few decades of respite the 1980s featured the savings 
and loans crises; which resulted from the ‘losses experienced across the financial system due 
to ‘risk shifting on the part of the banks’3as well as the collapse of the financial institution, 
Continental, Illinois which resulted in losses due to concentrated exposure, lost access to 
funding. The 1990s did not escape the occurrence of a crisis and in 1998 the failure of a large 
                                                          
1Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, and Ingo Walter ‘Market Failures and Regulatory 
Failures- Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises’ Asia Development Bank Institute Working Paper Series 
No. 264 February 2011 
2ibid 
3ibid 
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hedge fund was in danger of significant adverse effects on the financial system, due to its 
size. 
 
The above can b encapsulated in the following sequential features: 
Large capital inflows =>Confidence =>over extension of Credit =>Price misallocation 
=>Price crash =>Loss of trust =>Bank runs 
On examination of the above, two specific factors are prevalent: 
I) Market failure;  
As stated above the key role of the financial system is the allocation of capital and the key 
tool with which it does this is the appropriate determination of asset prices to properly reflect 
the value of such asset in the market. An ideal market determines the appropriate value 
reflecting prices of assets through the activity and symbiotic relationship of demand and 
supply. However markets fail. Bator notes that, market failure ‘[t]ypically……. [means] 
failure of a more less idealised system of price-market institutions’.4Commentary on market 
failure reveals a number of reasons for its occurrence: 
- Agency costs: This arises as a result of the prevalence of ‘separation of ownership…’5 in 
market participants’ arrangements.  
- Information asymmetry: As a direct result of agency arrangements in the market 
‘investors are not aware of certain information critical to their investment 
decisions………….’6 Even when market participants have the opportunity to receive such 
information they may lack the skill required to understand or utilise it. The agent, 
however, on acting as an agent acquires expertise on understanding and utilising the full 
                                                          
4Francis M. Bator, Anatomy of Market Failure, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Aug., 1958), 
pp. 351-379 
5Frank Partnoy, Financial Systems, Crises, and Regulation, Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Paper 
No. 14-154 May 2014  
6ibid 
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value of such information. This developed expertise results in continued reliance thereon 
and thus perpetuates the cycle of information asymmetry; 
- Cognitive error- All factions of commentators on market failure agree on the fact that 
individuals are bound to act irrationally and as a herd, particularly in times of unusual 
circumstances or a panic. Partnoy notes that; 
‘financial crises arise because individual market participants are 
irrational in some way, perhaps because they follow a herd mentality 
or mob psychology, or because they misperceive risk and 
reward…..financial markets crises arise in the aftermath of irrational 
investor mania and then panic…….panics and crashes are endemic to 
financial markets because of human nature and investor psychology’7 
- Moral Hazard- This arises from the adverse effect of protective measures/insurance made 
available to key financial institutions in the market undertaken to protect the market 
participants from the panic and crashes which are noted above as endemic to the market. 
The underlying thought is that these protective measures potentially results in increased 
risk exposure appetite making them vulnerable to failure which ultimately affects prices 
and creates the opportunity for market failure.  
 
II) Loss of trust   
The loss of trust resulting from market failure is generally represented by continued 
downward price movement and bank runs. The implication of this is reduction of liquidity in 
the market. 
 
 
                                                          
7ibid 
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1.1 GFC Peculiarities 
The GFC was a financial crisis and thus reflects the features of market failure and loss of trust 
considered above. However, it is considered that there are a number of peculiarities which are 
relevant to the objective of this work.  
In his assessment of the events leading up to the GFC, Lord Turner notedthat the following: 
- ‘the massive growth and increasing complexity of the securitised 
credit model underpinned by inadequate capital requirements against 
trading books, which facilitated unstable growth in credit extension to 
households and to some parts of the corporate sector; 
- Extensive commercial bank involvement in trading activities which 
meant that falling asset prices have had a large and rapid effect on 
bank profitability and in turn on perceptions of credit-worthiness 
creating a collapse in bank funding liquidity; 
- High leverage in multiple forms which helped drive the rapid 
growth in credit extension and asset prices, and which increased the 
vulnerability of the system, since asset price falls had an amplified 
impact on system capital adequacy; 
- Expanded maturity transformation dependent on the marketability 
of assets which made the system hugely more vulnerable to a loss of 
confidence and disappearance of liquidity; 
- The complexity and opacity of the structure credit and derivatives 
system built upon a misplaced reliance on sophisticated mathematics, 
which once irrational exuberance disappeared contributed to a 
collapse in confidence in credit ratings huge uncertainty about 
SRN: 1545515 
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appropriate prices and a lack of trust that published accounting figures 
captured the reality of emerging problems; 
- Lack of adequate capital buffers as a result of which commercial 
banks losses have driven falling confidence in the banking system 
impairing the ability of the banking system to extend credit and 
creating a powerful loop between banking system stress and down 
turn in the real economy’8 
 
Analysis on the GFC has indicated that the circumstances above were as a result of the 
following factors: 
I) Risk Taking incentives 
The reliance on the agency relationship in the operation of the financial market requires 
effective an effective corporate governance framework, to ensure an appropriate risk culture 
is preserved. This because of the risk of incentive misalignment between the agent and 
principal or shareholder. This was a particularly an influential cause of the GFC because it 
was noted that  
‘[d]ramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at 
many systemically important financial institutions- particular areas of 
emphasis here was the use of mathematical models by financial 
institutions and credit rating agencies such that ‘risk management 
became risk justification’9 and ‘compensation systems …..too often 
                                                          
8‘The Turner Review, A regulatory  response to the global banking crisis’ March 2009 
9Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report 
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rewarded the quick deal, the short-term gain-without proper 
consideration of long-term consequences10 
 
Thus there was a very strong commercial incentive for this persistent misalignment of risk 
appetite and poor risk management that corporate governance failed to curb.  
 
II) Systemic risk 
Systemic risk was recognised as a danger to the financial system before the GFC. It is 
encapsulated by ‘counterparty risk’11 and ‘spill over risk’ 12such that the failure of one 
financial institution to meet its financial obligations has the potential to immediately ripple 
through to its transaction counterparties. It was recognised as a threat to the US financial 
system in the collapse of a financial institution in the 1984. Furthermore, the danger was 
recognised in 1998 when the collapse of a hedge fund threatened the US financial system due 
its significant interconnections with systemic institutions. However, before the GFC systemic 
risk was only recognised as a potential within one nation’s financial system. The GFC 
revealed that the threat of systemic risk was capable of affecting several financial systems 
when financial institutions expand their transactional and commercial reach beyond their 
domiciles and across the globe.  
 
III) Banking activity 
The primary role of banking institutions is to serve as conduits of financial capital distribution 
to market participants and society in general. The GFC revealed a change in banking activity 
                                                          
10ibid 
11Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, and Ingo Walter ‘Market Failures and Regulatory 
Failures- Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises’ Asia Development Bank Institute Working Paper Series 
No. 264 February 2011 
12ibid 
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to a ‘‘new-model’ of banking [which] relied heavily on the short-term wholesale funding 
market…..Short-term liabilities were funding longer term, less liquid 
assets……………..’13.‘[F]inancial financial firms loaded up on assets with low volatility and 
high systemic risk (and therefore high expected returns). ……14. Such assets held ‘non-
diversifiable credit risk associated with the AAA tranches of securitised loan 
portfolios……..15. This ‘new model’ of banking meant that banking institutions were 
operating significantly and transacting with each other in the shadow banking system.  
Shadow banking activity is ‘usually defined as a complex network of credit intermediation 
outside the regulated banking sector’16. Its primary role was to transmit capital flows, credit 
and risk up to the banks and banking payment systems.  
‘The shadow banking system emerged from the transformation of the 
largest banks from low return on-equity (RoE) utilities that originate 
loans and hold and fund them until maturity with deposits, to high 
RoE entities that originate loans in order to warehouse and later 
securitize and distribute them, or retain securitized loans through off-
balance sheet asset management vehicles. In conjunction with this 
transformation, the nature of banking has changed from a credit-risk 
intensive, deposit-funded, spread-based process, to a less credit-risk 
intensive, but more market-risk intensive, wholesale funded, fee-based 
process.’17 
 
                                                          
13ibid 
14ibid 
15ibid 
16Photis Lysandrou and Anastasia Nesvetailova The Shadow Banking System and the Financial Crisis- A 
securities production function view’, Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development Working 
Paper Series No 5 ISSN 2052-8035 
17Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft Hayley Boesky ‘Shadow Banking’ Federal Reserve Bank Staff 
Report No. 458 July 2010, Revised February 2012 
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Thus it traditionally transacted in products which are essentially receptacles of risk such as 
collaterised debt obligations (CDOs), a structured Over the Counter (OTC) product which 
turned out to be ‘the epicentre of the [GFC]’.18 The shadow banking system is heavily 
dependent on ‘the capital and money markets in order to fulfil their function of ‘credit 
intermediation and maturity/ liquidity transformation functions’19. Given the nature of its 
activity it poses systemic risks to the financial system, furthermore, ‘…..financial institutions 
operating in the shadow banking system are subject to bank-like runs.’20 
It is noteworthy that  
‘[i]n the regulated banking sphere, the credit intermediation and 
attendant maturity and liquidity transformation functions are usually 
performed by banks without recourse to any intermediary role on the 
part of the capital and money markets.’21 
 
Notwithstanding this analysis of the GFC revealed that pursuant to the introduction of the 
advent of the ‘new model’ banking shadow banking activity was heavily conducted by  
‘bank owned or sponsored entities in the capital and money market 
domains for the primary purpose of expanding the rate of production 
of yield bearing debt securities required by the global investor 
community’.22 
 
                                                          
18Photis Lysandrou and Anastasia Nesvetailova The Shadow Banking System and the Financial Crisis- A 
securities production function view’, Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development Working 
Paper Series No 5 ISSN 2052-8035 
19ibid 
20ibid 
21ibid 
22ibid 
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Therefore it is no surprise that the banking liquidity was adversely affected by the GFC 
resulting in a ‘credit crunch’ across the financial system. It has been noted that banks 
participation in the shadow banking sector was the innovative solution to ‘take unregulated 
risk exposure ……so as to get relief from regulatory capital requirements and subsequently 
take on additional risks….23 
 
IV) Market and Product opacity 
The GFC has revealed the ills of OTC products, particularly CDOs. They are synthetically 
derived from, credit default swap (CDS) which are ‘U.S. private label securitization of weak 
credits’24and are essentially illiquid receptacles of risk used to place ‘bets on the performance 
of real mortgage-related securities’.25 Their illiquid nature is as a result of their complexity 
which is in turn as a result of the difficulty surrounding their valuation. This issue of 
complexity and valuation triggered the commencement of the GFC when in 2007 it was 
revealed by ‘BNP Paribas that it could not value the CDOs held by three of its hedge 
funds…26. 
 
                                                          
23Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, and Ingo Walter ‘Market Failures and Regulatory 
Failures- Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises’ Asia Development Bank Institute Working Paper Series 
No. 264 February 2011 
24International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Research Department and Institute for Capacity Development 
‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis- Some Uncomfortable Questions’ Stijn Claessens and 
Laura Kodres WP/14/46 March 2014 
25Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report 
26Photis Lysandrou and Anastasia Nesvetailova The Shadow Banking System and the Financial Crisis- A 
securities production function view’, Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development Working 
Paper Series No 5 ISSN 2052-8035 
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Another feature of their complexity was the opacity of the market in which they were traded. 
This opacity ‘made it much more difficult to know their true value and who incurred the 
various risks.’27 
 
V) Globalisation effect 
‘Globalisation finds perhaps its fullest expression in global capital flows and capital 
markets.28 It has been noted that ‘globalisation increased the volume of capital flows to and 
from nations’29…and this ‘increased capital flows to the United States in the 2000s facilitated 
the profound misallocation of capital in the [GFC]’30. One could argue that the increased 
commercial and accordingly risk appetite of market participants including; financial 
institutions and banks, resulted in the search for yield beyond their domiciles. The capital 
available for allocation in one financial system was significantly increased and with each 
cross-border transaction between financial institutions ‘ever-stronger financial linkages across 
countries’ 31were forged. This meant that the scope of the adverse effect of the systemic risk 
posed by a market participant was widened to potentially include the financial system of such 
market participant’s counterparties. The United States Financial Inquiry Commission’s report 
on the GFC noted one of the reasons for the GFC was a failure to appreciate the 
‘interconnections amongst firms and concentration of risk in the [OTC] market’.32 
 
                                                          
27International Monetary Fund Working Paper, Research Department and Institute for Capacity Development 
‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis- Some Uncomfortable Questions’ Stijn Claessens and 
Laura Kodres WP/14/46 March 2014IMF 
28Buckley, RP, Arner, DW ‘From Crisis to Crisis: The Global Financial System and Regulatory Failure University of 
Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2012/002 
29ibid 
30ibid 
31 ibid 
32Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report 
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Shadow banking thrived in the precipitation of globalisation since it widened the market for 
demand and supply of financial innovation i.e. OTC products. The wider market increased the 
availability of capital, which propagated an increase in confidence and debt. This ultimately 
led to ‘the emergence of large and persistent differences in credit growth and current account 
imbalances across countries….33. It is considered that the difficulty in valuing CDS and 
CDOs is significantly influenced by the fact that the weak credit risk profiles inherent in the 
underlying mortgage facilities. The wider the market, the wider the area of circulation of 
product transactions/transfer and the heightened difficulty in tracking the full information 
associated with such products as well as the originating source of such product.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33Buckley, RP, Arner, DW ‘From Crisis to Crisis: The Global Financial System and Regulatory Failure University of 
Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2012/002 
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2. REGULATION FAILURE 
Notwithstanding the peculiarities of the GFC, they still reflect the two foundational causes of 
financial crises; market failure and loss of trust. In aftermath of past financial crises 
regulatory measures or revisions have shown to be effective in restoring stability to the 
financial system. Some examples are outlined below: 
 
1907- The financial crisis of 1907 resulted in the institution of legislation that brought about 
the institution of ‘a lender of the last resort’34 to ensure financial stability. 
1930s- The banking panics resulting from price imbalances, debt inflation and ultimately 
stock market crashes led to the introduction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) and two pieces of innovative legislations; the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Their objective of the legislations was to ‘“shine a bright light” on 
financial information so that investors could make informed decisions [which it was 
considered would ultimately lead to establishing] confidence to make the markets function 
better.’35 
1984 (Continental Illinois and Too-Big-To-Fail Status) - For the first time the concepts of 
‘systemic risk’ and ‘too big to fail’ were introduced since the core issue of the crisis stemmed 
from a loss of confidence in the whole sale banking market. Thus, notwithstanding the 
implementation of the securities legislation in 1930s it became clear that the regulatory 
system would require updating to catch up with the activities in the US market and financial 
system.  
Late 1980s- The savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s arose from the interplay of a rise in 
interest rates and the banks significant investment in real estate lending and antiquated 
                                                          
34Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, and Ingo Walter ‘Market Failures and Regulatory 
Failures- Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises’ Asia Development Bank Institute Working Paper Series 
No. 264 February 2011 
35ibid 
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regulation. The concept of ‘regulation capture’ was featured as one of the significant reasons 
for the weakness of the regulatory architecture of the period. 
1990s- Regulation was also used to rectify ‘a systemically risky situation’36; when in the US a 
in 1998 a large hedge fund with significant interconnection across the financial system 
collapsed. The result of this crisis led to the implementation of legislation refining the 
‘procedures for winding up complicated systemic firms’37. 
 
On review of the above it is noted that a number of the features of the GFC highlighted in the 
GFC peculiarities above also featured in past financial crises to which regulation has served 
to rectify. Therefore since these issues were allowed to repeat themselves to disastrous effect 
it is considered that the underlying and primary cause of the GFC is regulation failure. The 
US’s Financial Crisis Commission, it is analysis of the GFC confirmed this and particularly 
noted that the GFC was caused by ‘widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision’38. In order to appreciate and identify the particular areas of such the following 
elements may be considered.  
 
I) Policy  
The difficulty of achieving good government policy amidst the juggling factors of political, 
economic and social concerns is acknowledged. It is possible that a conflict arises between 
financial system regulation and governmental agenda resulting in a skewered regulatory 
objective and framework. The failure to resolve such conflict by setting appropriate 
                                                          
36ibid 
37ibid 
38Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report 
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regulatory policy results in bad policy and ‘essentially a political failure’39.This has been 
shown in past crises.  The real estate lending strategy that resulted in the exposure of the 
banks following the increase in interest rates in the 1980s was as a result of government 
policy to further real estate development.40 
 
In the UK, it was noted that ‘……..in a political context ……….the worst offence the 
regulator could commit was to cause London to lose business.’41 This primary economic 
agenda led to ‘[t]he dominant economic philosophy, ………, was that markets were self-
correcting and that firms were best placed to manage their own risk.’42. This led to the 
adoption of the deregulation agenda pervasive across the UK and US. Deregulation 
effectively facilitated economic growth. This permissive environment created by deregulation 
was represented in the fact that ‘investment banks were permitted to use their own 
mathematical models of asset and portfolio risk to compute appropriate capital levels.’43 In 
the US,  
‘[t]he Fed ……….in 1996: ….permitted banks to use CDS to reduce 
capital reserves (Tett, 2009, p 49) [notwithstanding the fact that] CDS 
are financial derivatives that are transacted in unregulated, over-the-
counter (OTC) markets’44.  
 
                                                          
39David G. Tarr, ‘The Political, Regulatory and Market Failures That Caused the US Financial Crisis’, The World 
Bank Development Research Group Finance and Private Sector Development Team May 2010 Policy Research 
Paper 5324 
40Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, and Ingo Walter ‘Market Failures and Regulatory 
Failures- Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises’ Asia Development Bank Institute Working Paper Series 
No. 264 February 2011Market 
41Julia Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation, LSE Law, Society and Economy’ Working 
Papers 17/2010 London School of Economics and Political Science Law Department 
42ibid 
43Ross Levine ‘The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis’ Bank 
for International Settlements Working Papers No 329 November 2010 
44ibid 
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Furthermore, in his commentary on GFC Levine noted that ‘bad policy choices created 
perverse incentives that encouraged financial institutions to take excessive risk and divert 
society’s savings toward unproductive ends’45.  
 
The resultant increase liquidity of the banks in culmination with the operation of the 
‘affordable housing mandate’46 led to the increased appetite in reduction in real estate lending 
which set the stage for the crisis.  
 
Levine further points out that the pervasive effect of policy is not only reflected in the 
regulatory framework but in the supervisory approach. He noted that before the GFC ‘the 
SEC eliminated the risk management office and failed to complete a single inspection of a 
major investment bank in the year and a half before the collapse of those banks (Labaton, 
2008).’47 
 
II) Regulatory objective  
Further to the acknowledgement that financial crises are caused by market failure and loss of 
trust, it is considered that the objective of any effective financial market regulation should be 
the rectification or prevention of market failure and restoration of trust.  
 
The identification of the primary economic policy agenda inhibited the development of the 
appropriate and up to date regulatory objective and ultimately its architecture. Since it was 
believed that markets were self-correcting then it seemed the past financial crises that resulted 
                                                          
45ibid 
46David G. Tarr, ‘The Political, Regulatory and Market Failures That Caused the US Financial Crisis’, The World 
Bank Development Research Group Finance and Private Sector Development Team May 2010 Policy Research 
Paper 5324 
47Ross Levine ‘The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis’ Bank 
for International Settlements Working Papers No 329 November 2010 
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from market failure were forgotten. Thus whilst there was a regulatory architecture, 
implemented to address past financial crises there was no economic incentive to continuously 
reassert the financial regulatory objective in alignment with the financial innovative 
development in pursuit of economic growth. 
 
It is therefore no surprise that such that  
‘OTC derivatives rapidly spiralled out of control and out of sight, 
growing to $673 trillion in notional amount [and there was] 
uncontrolled leverage; lack of transparency, capital and collateral 
requirements; speculation; interconnections among firms and 
concentration of risk in this market’48 
 
Partnoy notes that “trust plays a key role in the formation and function of financial markets49 
because ‘financial systems are inherently unstable’50. He therefore considers that ‘an 
important role of financial regulation is to preserve trust.’51 In recognition of the susceptibility 
of financial systems to instability the failure in the aligning regulatory development with 
economic growth is effectively failing to put in measures to preserve trust. Again since it was 
considered that whilst markets may be unstable they are able to correct themselves the 
adoption of the deregulation agenda was not considered an obstruction to the required 
regulatory objective of preservation of trust. 
 
 
                                                          
48Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report 
49Frank Partnoy, ‘Financial Systems, Crises, and Regulation’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research 
Paper No. 14-154 May 2014 
50ibid 
51 ibid 
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III) Design 
In light of the defective regulatory objective and policy the regulatory design was also 
somewhat defective. The prevalent regulatory design approach before the GFC was Principles 
based regulatory design (PBR). PBR is, centred on‘a reliance on firms’ internal management 
(or in polycentric PBR, on the governance infrastructure of national states or other actors in 
the regime)’52 resulting, in meta-regulation or management based regulation53. Since the 
prevailing policy was that firms can be left to manage their own affairs, , ‘PBR was seen as 
the solution that firms and regulators were looking for to deliver an effective and responsive 
regulatory regime’54.The ‘regulated’ therefore is deemed to be a conscientious regulatory 
partner of the regulator and thus plays an influential role in regulatory content. This means 
that in a primarily PBR focused regulatory environment the regulatory content is vulnerable 
to regulatory capture, that is, ‘regulation ………. being tailored for the benefit of the 
regulated.’55 However, the GFC revealed that, ‘a principles-based approach does not work 
with individuals who have no principles.’56 The result of this culminated in the defective 
regulatory architecture that facilitated the GFC. 
 
IV) Content and scope 
The regulatory architecture before the GFC centred on disclosure, conduct and capital 
regulation. However, ‘“deregulation” divert[ed] attention from the crucial task of fixing the 
                                                          
52Julia Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation, LSE Law, Society and Economy’ Working 
Papers 17/2010 London School of Economics and Political Science Law Department 
53ibid 
54ibid 
55Leon Courville, ‘Financial Crisis: a perfect storm or regulatory failure’ 
56Julia Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation, LSE Law, Society and Economy’ Working 
Papers 17/2010 London School of Economics and Political Science Law DepartmentJ 
SRN: 1545515 
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perverse regulations in place and identifying where new regulation is needed’57. The pursuit 
of this particular policy revealed that lessons were note learned from past crises ‘Congress 
repeated with Fannie and Freddie the mistake that caused the collapse of the S&L industry’58. 
Thus these pieces of regulation were either defective when compared with the financial 
activity undertaken at the time.  
 
The detrimental effect of the considerations above was reflected in the Basel regulation of the 
time. The Basel suite of regulations is developed from international co-operation amongst the 
G20 countries particularly focused on cross border financial transactions, including but not 
limited to, capital retention.  It was noted that  
‘….in the case of the transition from Basel I to Basel II there is ample 
evidence to indicate that the major international financial institutions 
played a key role………………… many modifications were made 
favouring regulated institutions. This is illustrated by the reliance on 
internal models for measuring risk.’59 
 
Furthermore there was a ‘[l]ack of regulation on liquidity mismatches…’60‘Basel II rules in 
2007, …….[allowed] for more use of internal bank models in the assessment of risk,.’61 The 
full scope of systemic risk was blinded by the economic and commercial fruits of 
                                                          
57David G. Tarr, ‘The Political, Regulatory and Market Failures That Caused the US Financial Crisis’, The World 
Bank Development Research Group Finance and Private Sector Development Team May 2010 Policy Research 
Paper 5324World 
58ibid 
59Leon Courville, ‘Financial Crisis: a perfect storm or regulatory failure 
60Jorge Roldos, ‘Failure of Regulation and Supervision’ International Monetary Fund Institute for Capacity 
Development 
61David G. Tarr, ‘The Political, Regulatory and Market Failures That Caused the US Financial Crisis’, The World 
Bank Development Research Group Finance and Private Sector Development Team May 2010 Policy Research 
Paper 5324World 
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globalisation and financial instrument innovation. Thus, the ‘OTC derivatives markets were 
allowed to grow without transparency or central clearing’.62 
 
With respect to the disclosure suite of regulations it is noteworthy that ‘the risks associated 
with complex securitization transactions and their underlying financial assets, including 
subprime mortgage loans, were fully disclosed; but that failed to prevent the catastrophic 
collapse of the securitization markets………………….’63. 
 
V) Supervisory philosophy or approach 
In light of the deregulation agenda, the supervisory approach was effectively limited to 
minimum interference financial market activity which ‘opened gaps in oversight of critical 
areas with trillions of dollars at risk s’64. In summary there was: 
- lack of adequate macro-prudential supervision 
- ineffective early warning mechanisms 
- problem of competencies- i.e. in their oversight duties supervisors failed to 
perform to an adequate standard their responsibilities. failure to challenge 
supervisory practices on cross-border basis] 
- lack of frankness and cooperation between supervisors 
- lack of consistent supervisory powers across Members States…………………’65 
- reliance ‘on sophisticated financial analysis of great intellectual appeal for its 
ability to quantify risks with few numbers66 
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The manpower size, organisational structure, authority and quality of the regulator and 
supervision measures were adversely affected.  
 
In light of these failures it is no surprise that the prevailing regulatory framework and 
structure was ill-equipped to prevent or immediately rectify the disastrous effects of GFC.  
 
2.1 REGULATION AFTER GFC 
In an attempt to rectify the regulation failure that led to (or at the very least facilitated the 
GFC) the elements of regulation have been reviewed and continue to be reviewed particularly 
in light of the GFC peculiarities.  
 
I) Revisiting the financial regulation objective and policy 
The elements of regulatory failure above made it clear that a policy change on financial 
regulation was required. Thus, whilst, the political challenge of achieving economic 
development remains, it now recognised that ‘close linkages between financial stability and 
the health of the real economy’67. Further it is accepted that a regulatory framework will be 
required to achieve such stability. Thus it is now accepted that effective regulatory framework 
will serve to foster financial stability in the financial system which will boost health in the 
real economy. Financial stability has been declared ‘a public good’68 by creating It‘a more 
favourable environment for savers and investors’69. It is considered that financial stability 
encourages confidence in the financial system since 
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‘[i]f lenders lose confidence in the continued stability of the 
institutions to whom they have entrusted their funds, or in the integrity 
of the markets in which they have invested, they will seek to reduce 
their exposure and place their assets elsewhere.’70 
 
Whilst the value of financial stability is recognised its prescriptive definition proves elusive. 
Notwithstanding this, commentary on the subject has agreed that it includes the stability of 
the financial market institutions as well as the financial market. 
 
Conceptually, from a financial market perspective, ‘stability ,,,,,,,,,,,means the absence of 
price movements that cause wider economic damage…….’71.The attempt to achieve financial 
or systemic stability from the financial market perspective has proved more specifically 
elusive in policy revisions. It is considered that the reason for this is that any regulatory 
influence on asset prices determination has the potential to adversely affect the desire 
efficiency of the market. Nonetheless, the GFC has shown that volatility in asset prices can 
adversely affect financial flows in the financial system and vice versa which in turn ‘has the 
capacity to create “spill-over” effects72 including undermining ‘the stability of financial 
institutions. As we have learned above, the health of financial institutions is subject to 
contagion effect thus price instability affects global economy.  
 
This revision in policy has ultimately affected the regulatory objective. It is considered that 
the implication of this revision is simply the reassertion of the desired regulatory objectives 
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identified above; addressing market failure and preservation of trust in the financial system. 
The regulatory agenda of deregulation is clearly at an end. 
 
II) Rethinking Regulatory Design 
The policy and objective revisions noted above resulted in a revision in regulatory design. 
The PBR model has suffered greatly as a result. It has now become the ‘derogatory label used 
to conjure up regulatory ineffectiveness’73. Black notes that this is no surprise since PBR is 
predicated on ‘extensive trust between the actors in the regulatory regime’74…and without it 
‘there is little scope for PBR to operate in any substantive way and little chance that other will 
be afforded much discretion through the use of principles in the rulebooks’75. However, Black 
also notes that ‘[g]overnance and regulatory scholars and ‘better regulation’ practitioners 
rarely hold out much hope for the effectiveness of ‘command and control’ or detailed rules 
based regulation’.76 
 
Therefore it is no surprise that the UK regulator, Financial Services Authority (FSA) (as it 
was then known) immediately changed their strategy to ‘evidence based, risk based, 
principles based, and ….outcomes focused regulator, all at the same time’77. On review of 
regulatory strategies implemented since the GFC it is clear that risk based approach features 
prominently in the current regulatory agenda and design. The ultimate focus seems to be on 
‘risks not rules’78 such that regulators veer away from a ‘tick box’ attitude to compliance. 
Black considers that  
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‘rules themselves, including any principles, play a rather ambivalent 
role in risk-based regulation. Their point of entry into the supervisory 
process is not in the design of the risk based system, or even its 
implementation. Rather it comes later, when a regulator is considering 
taking enforcement action against conduct or activities which it 
considers to be posing too high a risk.79 
 
This means that contrary to the ‘light touch’ regime of the regulator amidst the environment 
of deregulation supervision is now enhanced and the regulator will now play a hands on role 
in facilitating the regulatory agenda. Black considers that this heavy reliance on regulator 
elevation might result in ‘a critical lacuna in the regulatory regime.’80It is considered that the 
evidence of this lacuna is starting to emerge particularly in the area of product regulation. 
 
Notwithstanding this possibility Black identified that ‘the financial crisis was a global 
experiment in the effectiveness of a wide range of regulatory techniques and institutional 
structures of financial regulation. All of them failed at least once.81Therefore, it is considered 
that there can be little criticism for an approach that attempts to encapsulate all known 
techniques with the prominent aim of satisfying the reasserted regulatory objectives.. 
 
III) Supervision approach 
In light of the change in regulatory design, the change in supervisory approach is evident. The 
FSA, for example, reflected this by structuring its organisation and splitting itself into two 
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arms- Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA). 
The regulatory model is now one of ‘intensive supervision’ which was intended to include: 
a) implementation of its risk-based system of supervision and a greater focus on risk 
identification and the integration of macro-prudential analysis into firm-specific 
supervision; 
b) manner in which FSA relies on senior management; 
c) third dimension to the FSA’s changed approach is its focus on outcomes; and 
d) policy of what it terms ‘credible deterrence’82 
 
This means that the revised regulatory agenda will require a new brand of regulator that must 
be properly equipped with the expertise to not only understand the full scope of financial 
activity within its remit but to identify any underlying risks such activity may pose to the 
financial system.  It is therefore considered that the excuse of the limited skill of the regulator 
is no longer permitted as an excuse for any potential future financial crisis. 
 
IV) New Regulatory Content and scope 
The vision of financial stability of financial institutions and markets is accordingly reflected 
in the revised regulatory architecture in content and scope. It led to certain 
regulatory/legislative measures domestically and on an international level.  
 
From an international perspective the third iteration of the Basel suite of regulations (Basel 
III) were adopted including, but not limited tocapital requirements. These further include 
measures for a countercyclical capital buffer and a surcharge for globally systemically 
important financial institutions (G-SIFIs), both of which represent a first international 
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attempt to institute a macro-prudential tool. More generally the scope of regulatory change 
included the following: 
- Agreement reached on one of two envisioned liquidity standards – the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR). 
- Some progress on reducing too-big-to-fail, with the identification of G-SIFIs, 
domestically systemically important banks (D-SIBs), higher capital adequacy 
requirements and more intense supervision, and some reforms of national resolution 
schemes (including bail-in instruments) so that failing institutions can be resolved 
without wider disruptions. 
- Enhancements to the “securitization model.” 
- Adoption of principles for sound compensation practices, to avoid perverse incentives 
for risk-taking. 
- Agreement in principle on similar treatment of some types of financial transactions 
under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
- Some closure of data gaps, e.g., the beginning of harmonized collection of improved 
consolidated data on bilateral counterparty and credit risks of major systemic banks (for 
the major 18 G-SIBs and 6 other non-G-SIBs from 10 jurisdictions). 
- Some OTC derivatives reforms.83 
 
It is noted that ‘……there are strong parallels between the U.S. regulatory responses and the 
European regulatory responses.....84. Thus considerations of the revised regulatory content 
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will focus on these responses with only certain distinctions made in the event of differing 
approaches on a particular issue. 
 
In the US under Title I (the Financial Stability Act of 2010) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) was created to: 
 identify risks to US financial stability that could arise from the material financial distress 
or failure, or on-going activities of large interconnected bank holding companies (BHCs) 
or non-bank financial companies. 
 promote market discipline by eliminating expectations of stockholders, creditors and 
counterparties that the federal government will shield them from losses in the event of the 
failure of these large interconnected BHCs or non-bank financial companies 
 respond to emerging threats to the stability of the US financial system 
In the EU, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was embodied to be responsible for 
the macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system and the prevention and mitigation 
of systemic risk.’85 
 
In summary the revised regulatory content can be categorised into the following; 
a) Conduct of Business  
The regulation of conduct still plays a prominent role in the revised regulatory architecture 
since ‘no matter how tight or well intentioned the rules may be, the end result is greatly 
influenced by the actors who are regulated’86.  
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Accordingly in the US the Dodd-Frank Act includes new Conduct of Business (COB) 
standards ‘including a ’best interests’ duty when advising a state, municipality, pension plan 
or endowment’87. In the EU ‘the 2014 [Markets in Financial Instrument Directive and 
Regulation] MiFID II/MiFIR88regime will retain the central pillars of existing EU COB 
regulation, but will significantly bolster the regulation of remuneration-based risks’89. They 
also include bolstered suitability and appropriateness duties similar to those imposed by the 
Dodd Frank Act in the US but which also includes a semblance of or first steps towards a 
product regulation regime.  
 
b) Financial Market and Market Infrastructure 
In the aftermath of the GFC 
‘[r]egulators around the world acknowledged the need for structural 
reforms to the financial system and to market infrastructures in 
particular. Due to the global dimension of the crisis and the extent to 
which financial markets has been revealed to be closely 
interconnected, national regulators moved the related policy debate to 
the supranational level’90 
 
Therefore the regulatory revisions took their guidance from the key guiding principles of the 
G20 summit from which the FSB and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) received their mandate of devising ‘securities market regulation to 
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foster efficiency, transparency and resilience.’91 Accordingly ‘the four pillars set by the FSB- 
Standardisation, mandatory trading, mandatory clearing, and mandatory reporting’92. With 
respect to these have translated into legislative measures in theEU includingthe MiFID II and 
MiFIR as well as 
‘the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), and the 
regulation on improving securities settlement in the EU and on CSDs 
(CSDR). With respect to the US, it considers the 2010 Dodd Frank 
Act and the role played by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in regulation and supervision of [Financial Market 
Infrastructure] FMIs.’93 
 
The FMI regulatory architecture also seeks to enhance market integrity by imposing trading 
standardisation. In Europe, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD)‘has been the testing ground 
for pan EU measures prohibiting insider dealing and market manipulation’94. Financial market 
trading standardisation has attempted to drive directly into the issue of price formation 
without affecting the economic operation of the market but achieving investor confidence and 
protection. The exchange has proved an effective vehicle for achieving this since it facilitates 
‘regulation of trading practices to ensure that prices set on official markets accurately reflect 
market supply and demand’.95 
 
 
                                                          
91 ibid 
92 ibid 
93 ibid 
94Harry McVea ‘Supporting Market Integrity’ Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation OUP 2015 pg 631 
95 Andreas Martin Fleckner, Regulating Trading Practices pg 605 Oxford handbook of financial regulation 
SRN: 1545515 
 
Page 31 of 61 
 
c) Capital 
The capital adequacy requirements of Basel II have been revised by Basel III which has 
resulted in the revision of corresponding national legislations. The agenda of Basel III has 
been best described as a ‘risk-sensitive market-based approach for calculating [bank] 
regulatory capital’.96This approach reflects a change in bank capital philosophy from micro-
economic focus to the macro-economic policy agenda. 
‘Macro-prudential regulation consists of three main areas: 1) adjusting 
the application of regulatory rules to institutions according to 
developments in the broader economy (i.e. counter-cyclical capital 
requirements); (2) imposing economy-wide controls on the financial 
sector to limit aggregate risk taking (i.e. capital controls to limit 
foreign exchange risks or system-wide leverage limits); and (3) 
prudential requirements for financial infrastructure or firms providing 
infrastructure services (i.e. capital requirements for derivative clearing 
houses)….....’97 
 
The implementation of Basel III in the US has resulted in the requirement that banks to 
maintain a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) of a ‘minimum amount of high-quality liquid assets 
(HQLAs)—assets that can be easily and immediately converted into cash with little or no 
loss of value’.98 In the EU, the Basel III implementation ‘mandates higher capital 
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requirements for investments in ABS [and] disfavors investments in ABS for purposes of 
satisfying its [LCR].’99 
 
2.2 ELIMINATING GFC PECULIARITIES  
In order to consider the efficiency of these measures, it is considered that they ought to be 
analysed against the GFC peculiarities outlined above. 
 
a) Systemic Risk 
Systemic risk was not unknown before the GFC. In the analysis of GFC peculiarities it was 
noted above, that embedded in systemic risk are two types of risk; ‘counterparty risk’ and 
‘spill over risk’. However what was not fully appreciated before the GFC was the potential 
scope of such ‘spill over’ risk. The globalisation of commercial activity resulted in an 
interconnected commercially fluid global environment before the GFC. 
 
The Financial Market and Financial Market infrastructure (FMI) legislation referred to above 
are focused on addressing systemic risk. The ultimate aim is to enhance the profile of FMIs 
such that they become ‘potential sources of liquidity and as transparency providers to the 
markets and as a mechanism to mitigate systemic risk’.100The internationally generated 
legislative architecture surrounding FMIs which include standardisation, mandatory trading, 
mandatory clearing, and mandatory reporting (the four pillars set by the FSB) now 
specifically address counterparty and spill over risk. Notwithstanding the international co-
operation that designed the concepts and aims of these legislative measures the differences in 
the actual domestic legislation still poses an obstacle to fully tackling systemic risk. An 
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example of this is conflicting measures and extraterritoriality issues brought about by the 
interaction between the US’s Dodd Frank Act and the EU’s EMIR and MiFID measures. 
Thus ‘harmony and domestic interest do not always move in the same directions.’101 
 
It is considered that a crucial aspect of systemic risk is the health of financial institutions. 
Thus the issue of counterparty risk and spill over risk only become adverse to the financial 
system if the financial institution is itself not conducting its activities in a risk-averse manner. 
It has been noted that ‘in the crisis financial firms loaded up on assets with low volatility and 
high systemic risk (and therefore high expected returns). ……102. It was further noted 
‘……..large expected returns ….go hand in hand with large aggregate risk…. ….this is why 
financial institutions got into so much trouble when the negative aggregate shock to the real 
estate market began in 2007’103. Therefore in order to fully address the issue of systemic risk 
mitigation it is essential to deal with the risk taking incentive issue that has been identified 
above as a GFC peculiarity. 
 
b) Risk Taking incentive 
It has been noted that ‘dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at 
many systemically important financial institutions’104were one of causes of the GFC. It is 
considered that an evident feature of such corporate governance failure is the failure to 
properly balance the financial institution’s need to generate revenue against the risks 
exposure attached to any revenue generating activity and product.  
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Regulatory attempts at rectifying this have included for example, the improvement of the 
COB legislative measures and certain aspects of Basel III. These measures have sought to 
impose a corporate governance framework that requires the governing bodies of financial 
institutions are fully conscious risk exposure of the institution’s activities and the systemic 
risk they may pose to the wider financial and economic system.  
 
 In the UK regulations also drill down to the foster the transparency, particularly with regards 
to remuneration arrangements105 (which ensure that there is no undue pressure to override the 
considerations of the regulations) and best execution106 (which require conscionable and 
transparent conduct in obtaining/quoting a price of a financial product) but manner in which 
now include express accountability measures with respect to best execution. It is considered 
that the effect of these legislative measures is to heighten the fiduciary duties expected of 
employees and management bodies of financial institutions. Whilst the economic and societal 
benefits of this agenda are clear, its realistic viability is doubtful since financial institution are 
commercial enterprises driven to generate profit. Further, it is considered that the regulatory 
design of PBR and its ills have been unavoidably retained here. This is because there is still 
some significant reliance on institutions to interpret and adhere to these in a way that they can 
proportionally can. This pathway is unavoidable because the past has shown that prescriptive 
rules, particularly relating to this particular aspect and in the economic environment of 
capitalism is the only feasible route to achievable success. 
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c) Market and Product Opacity  
Market and product opacity has been significantly blamed for the GFC. The key reasons for 
this are complexity of financial market operation and complexity of the financial products 
being traded, specifically OTC products. Market opacity made it difficult for counterparties to 
fully evaluate counterparty risk spill over risk (and systemic risk as notes above). The issue 
with OTC products was their intrinsic complexity which made it difficult to clearly identify 
their price, or the risk exposure attached to transactions in such products. This means that no 
matter how robust the legislative measures are taken to address the risk taking incentive GFC 
peculiarity identified above, if the risks and value of OTC products are unknown, financial 
institutions will be unable to properly assess their risk appetite relating to such products or 
despatch their duties efficiently. Thus if these complexities are not properly dealt with in the 
current revised regulatory architecture the risk of another devastating GFC is unavoidable.  
Thus it is noted that the scope of disclosure has been widened to include on the disclosure of 
risks of the OTC products and their underlying assets as well as due diligence requirements 
applicable to the OTC transaction counterparties. In the US this is reflected in 
‘[s]ection 942(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act[which] requires, for each 
issue of ABS, the disclosure of information regarding the financial 
assets backing each class (sometimes called “tranche”) of those 
securities’107 
 
Schwarcz has criticised this approach since  
‘disclosure in securitization transactions is unlikely by itself to be 
meaningful. Prior to the financial crisis, the risks associated with 
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complex securitization transactions and their underlying financial 
assets, including subprime mortgage loans, were fully disclosed; but 
that failed to prevent the catastrophic collapse of the securitization 
markets………………….’108 
 
He does look more favourably on the EU‘s ‘simplification’ approach in seeking to address of 
the same GFC peculiarity. 
‘Article 8 of Chapter 3 describes the simplicity requirement, which 
includes a true sale or similar transfer of the underlying financial 
assets…………[which] must themselves meet simplicity 
requirements, including being homogenous, creditworthy (e.g., not in 
default, not from obligors that are insolvent or have adverse credit 
history or low credit scores), and not constituting already securitized 
financial assets.109 
 
It is already noted that the issue with OTC products was intrinsically their complexity. It is 
not clear how these measures will directly address this. The risk retention measure possibly 
imposes some cautionary ‘risk and reward’ considerations of the product originators at the 
point of origination but since these OTC products are first and foremost hedging or risk 
receptacles it is unlikely to be effective. Furthermore it is possible that the risk retention 
requirements does nothing more than exacerbate the contagion of systemic risk since the risk 
of a product is not divested but simply shared amongst counterparties. Further, it is 
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considered that rather than dispel complexity the risk retention element may also increase 
complexity of the transactions in the market. 
 
The EU measure of standardization and simplification may be a viable alternative. As noted 
by Schwarcz this approach ‘does not require standardization but merely rewards standardized 
simplicity—and it appears to contemplate a significant degree of market flexibility in 
achieving that simplicity’.110However it is noteworthy that the increase in the size of the OTC 
market was not simply due to hedging strategy demand but to ‘meet the increasing demand 
made upon the asset management function, institutional investors require increasing amounts 
of yield bearing securities, including debt securities’111. In other words there was a 
speculative demand for yield. In an environment of lowly maintained interest rate and the 
precarious real estate market the demand for yield remains. In the environment of persistent 
financial innovation, the possibility of the creation of even more complex financial products 
remains a commercial reality. 
 
d) Banking Activity 
It is argued that this vein of financial innovation runs through the banking activity that 
facilitated and caused the GFC. Shadow banking has been heavily blamed for the GFC since 
the shadow banking participants primarily traded in and created the credit risk OTC products 
that lay at the heart of the GFC. It is considered that credit, risk and commercial activity and 
demand are intrinsic financial market activity. These factors, collectively, amidst deregulation 
created a free flow of financial innovation in the shadow banking environment. It is 
considered that the shadow banking activity arose directly as a result of financial innovation. 
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If financial innovation in the years preceding the GFC resulted in OTC products that were so 
complex that BNP Paribas could not value it then financial innovation in the future still poses 
the same disastrous potential.  
 
In recognition of this, there has been much debate about subjecting shadow banking to a 
specific regulatory architecture or bringing the activity into the ‘formal’ regulatory 
architecture applicable to regulated banking. However, it is considered a poignant point here 
that the GFC, and particularly the adverse liquidity issues it posed on society were not 
directly caused solely by shadow banking activity but by the shadow banking activity of the 
regulated banks.. Therefore it is considered that if the aim of regulating the shadow banking 
sector is to prevent another GFC it would be of limited benefit. 
 
An alternative measure has been to require banking institutions to separate their retail 
banking/payment systems activity from their investment banking activity since such activity 
is more likely to engage in shadow banking activity. In the US this embodied in 
‘the Volcker Rule, which bans financial intermediaries with bank 
affiliates from engaging in a broad range of trading –related activities, 
including trading on behalf of clients, if doing so would give rise to a 
‘material conflict of interest’….The Dodd-Frank Act also created two 
new categories of market participants in derivatives markets- swap 
dealers and major swap participant- and imposed new COB standards 
on them, including a ’best interests’ duty when advising a state, 
municipality, pension plan or endowment’112 
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A number of issues are worthy of consideration. If the banks’ shadow banking activities 
played an active role in the causes of the GFC simply transferring that activity to non-banking 
institutions simply creates a new bubble of institutions susceptible to systemic risk. The GFC 
has revealed that non-banking institutions operating in the shadow banking universe are 
equally subject to bank runs- not least because these non-banking institutions are inevitably 
still connected to banks. Perhaps the underlying idea is to ensure that in the event of failure of 
these divested shadow banking entities their failure will not adversely affect the payment 
institutions that are directly connected with the retail public-thus avoiding or reducing 
payment institutions exposure to failure and bank runs. However, banks are commercial 
institutions with a need to engage in commercial activity to ensure their survival.  In addition, 
banks are perpetually subject to gaps in synchronicity of receipts. In order for this gap to be 
ordinarily synchronised ‘significantly large cash balances would be required since ‘cash 
holding provides either no or very low return, so that the opportunity costs of holding large 
working balances is quite high’113. Therefore for banks to survive, they need to ‘economise on 
cash holdings’ 114 ‘by placing funds on deposit in the money market when cash balances are 
temporarily too high [and earn a higher rate of return] and by withdrawing or borrowing funds 
when the balance is too low’.115 The money market plays a distinct role of funding in the 
shadow banking sector. Thus it is considered the connection to the shadow banking system is 
unavoidable. 
 
The EU has sought to tackle this issue through its COB regulatory architecture, specifically 
‘the 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR regime will retain the central pillars of 
existing EU COB regulation, ……………will retain the suitability 
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and appropriateness duties with some additions….When building 
products and services together, an investment firm will need to 
apportion the costs of each component inform clients whether the 
different components may be bought separately and even inform 
clients when bundling creates risks different from those of the 
component parts. The regime will also provide greater protection for 
clients trading complex products, by amending the scope of 
application of the appropriateness duty. While non-complex products 
will remain outside the rule’s reach, structured undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) will now be 
regarded as complex and thus within the rules’ scope’116 
 
In response to the EU measures the underlying threads seems to be the expansion of the 
disclosure regime along with an enhanced fiduciary duty to reflect an ‘appropriateness duty’. 
We have seen above that disclosure cannot by itself be effective since it was not effective in 
preventing the GFC. The ‘appropriateness duty’ test may prove effective if a clear description 
of ‘non-complex’ and ‘complex’ products are expressly identified from a regulatory content 
perspective and understood from a regulator enforcement perspective. Perhaps the avenue in 
resolving this regulatory lacuna lies in the revised, enhanced supervisory/regulator approach 
described above which will include regulator’s appreciation of risk.  
 
e) Globalisation  
The GFC was essentially market failure without walls. As noted above whilst the concept of 
market failure was not new it is considered that the unique features of the GFC was the effect 
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of globalisation. Therefore, in order to have an effective mitigating regulatory architecture it 
must be tested from a global perspective. This would be facilitated by not just harmony and 
collective governmental agreement of principles and aims but significant uniformity of 
regulatory content, implementation and enforcement. Otherwise there is a risk of regulatory 
arbitrage and failure of overarching regulatory aims. Accordingly it is noted that ‘….there are 
international externality effects from national policy choices, especially in areas such as the 
implementation of financial regulation, reserve accumulation and capital controls’.117 
Whilst it is recognised that  
‘the main responsibility for adapting policy regimes to cope with 
financial globalisation lies with national governments. In general, 
domestic policy reforms should be complementary to parallel reforms 
at the international level.118 
 
 Notwithstanding this, there are externality effects reflected, for example, in the 
extraterritoriality issues resulting from the conflict between the desired extraterritoriality 
provisions of the US’s Dodd Frank Act and the EU’s EMIR and MiFID/MiFIR measures. 
 
Furthermore, the role that regulation failure played in the GFC, particularly the failure of 
globally conceived regulatory measures (particularly Basel I) has resulted in reticence by 
some countries to be beholden wholly to international legislative instruction.  
‘Countries that have adhered to the international set of rules have 
suffered from the spill-over of the crisis. They may want to insulate 
themselves from future contamination… It the thesis of regulatory 
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failure is adequate, one should observe some countries distancing 
themselves from the international consensus inasmuch as there is one. 
And indeed this is what is happening. For instance, Singapore insists 
on mandating the clearing of derivatives involving a party based in its 
jurisdiction. This point can be summarized easily:’119 
 
If the international externality persists on regulatory measures then such externalities would 
persist in supervisory implementation or enforcement measures. Perhaps a viable solution can 
arise from re-examining globalisation not just as a cautionary measure amidst ‘crises 
avoidance’ regulatory measures but as a guide to build a robust playing field or financial 
system. 
 
Globalisation has been successful in developing financial commercial activity across 
jurisdictions. Its success fostered great strides in financial innovation through securitisation. It 
is considered that the reason it has been so successful is the uniform agreement on the 
description and function of innovative financial products across jurisdictions. Thus it was 
easy to trade OTC products across borders because there was an understanding of what they 
were to be used for in both transacting jurisdictions. Thus there were no externalities. 
 
The considerations above have shown that not only was the GFC a result of market failure it 
was really as a result of regulation failure. The scope of such regulation failure has been 
pervasive at varying levels across the institution, financial market activity, infrastructure and 
even policy. Accordingly the regulatory measures adopted to rectify such failures have been 
vast and seemingly far reaching- possibly because there was a lot of ground to catch up to 
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financial innovation. In any event it is considered that in light of the continued strides of 
globalisation and financial innovation in conjunction with the significant role that the 
innovative complex OTC products played in instigating the GFC the regulatory strides would 
be incomplete without properly address product regulation in the financial regulation 
framework.  
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3. PRODUCT REGULATION: FINAL FRONTIER OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION?  
Examination of the revised regulatory architecture aimed at addressing the GFC peculiarities 
reveals that much effort has been done but it is considered that the interplay of the particular 
GFC peculiarities may hinder the desired effectiveness of these regulatory revisions. There is 
a global consciousness of the interconnection of the financial institutions of countries across 
the globe. The potential for contagion has been recognised amidst a flourishing globalisation 
regime. The health of financial institutions has been reasserted as core to risk mitigation and 
preservation of financial stability. In addition it has been noted above that the ultimate vehicle 
through which globalisation was able to flourish was through the development of innovative 
financial products which were traded freely by multi-national financial institutions.  Financial 
market regulation has experience an overhaul to seemingly address all these issues. However 
it is considered that the framework surrounding product regulation is not sufficient to 
safeguard the financial system against another GFC event. In order to address this it is 
essential to initially consider the nature of OTC products, its function in the financial system 
before reviewing the regulatory framework implemented. 
 
Financial innovation that birthed OTC products arose due to demand. They were initially 
developed as risk receptacles required pursuant to ‘to hedge the risk of the underlying 
investment’.120However these risk receptacles were found to possess the dual benefit of risk 
transfer and ‘rent’ yielding. Much like any other piece of innovation, ‘financial innovation is 
welfare neutral’121thus it is no surprise that amidst increasing demand for rent yielding 
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investment strategies, these innovative products gradually became significantly featured in 
financially speculative transactions. Avgouleas notes that the increase in the demand for these 
products was exacerbated by, amongst other factors; the ‘advent of global markets’122, ‘rapid 
advancement in telecommunications technology and computing capacity’ 123and ‘neo-liberal 
economic doctrine and deregulation’124. He further notes that this demand for ‘rent seeking 
speculative innovative products led to  
‘the creation of a number of exotic, opaque, complex and barely 
understood high risk reward financial products e.g. Collateralised 
Debt obligations ((CDOs), essentially amounting to a double 
securitisation process)’125 
 
If the above is accepted then in light of the fact that efforts at globalisation and rapid 
advancement in technology show no signs of abating the regulatory architecture must be 
improved to catch up with financial innovation and guard against its potentially harmful 
effects on the financial system. 
 
The commentary above on the market and product opacity shows that tentative steps are 
being taken in this respect. If considered from a wider perspective,  
‘…the US and the EU –post 2008 regulation of financial innovation 
regulation show a certain degree of similarity and may be summarised 
as follows: 
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(a) Outright prohibition of financial products such as the EU ban on 
uncovered (‘naked’) short sales and sovereign CDS trading; 
(b) Centralisation of derivatives trading and clearing and mandatory 
margin requirements for over the counter (OTC) derivatives; 
(c) Restriction of bank involvement in securitisation and shadow 
banking activity; best example here is the Volcker Rule 
restriction  
(d) Mandatory originator/sponsor investment participation 
(‘retention’) in securitisations and comprehensive capital 
charges for such participation (to capture the risk off balance –
sheet assets) under Basel III….. 
(e) Licensing regimes for alternative investment vehicles such as 
the (excessively) afr-reaching EU Alternatives Investment Fund 
Managers Directive (AIFMD) 
(f) Strict liquidity requirements for money market funds 
……………….. 
(g) New regimes for the governance of financial innovation under a 
clear regulatory mandate 
(h) New powers given to financial consumer supervisors to ban 
innovative financial products and services if deemed to harm 
investor welfare and/or financial stability and establishment of 
financial consumer authorities either as independent entities like 
the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ……. 
(i) Initiatives to control automated trading, especially HFT and 
increase in transparency of all trading venues in the EU……. 
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(j) FSB-initiated measures to tackle the procyclical nature of risks 
and incentives associated with secured financing contracts such 
as repos and securities lending that may exacerbate funding 
strains in time of runs…………… 
(k) Other FSB proposals for the supervision of shadow banking 
entities, other than [Money Market Funds] MMFs’126 
 
On review of the above these measures it is considered that they appear to deal with product 
regulation from the following perspectives: 
I) Prohibition- This worked as an emergency measure on the on-set of the GFC and 
in limited targeted measures still works as an instrument of curtailing systemic 
risk. However, as noted above, financial innovation, globalisation and 
technological innovation show no signs of abating. Therefore, the development of 
OTC products will continue. In order for this approach to effectively work without 
stifling innovation the inherent risks of an OTC product will have to be identified 
on origination, following testing or in any event before widespread use or before it 
can cause damage to the stability of the financial system. Notwithstanding the 
continued advancement of mathematical risk assessment and calculation tools, it is 
considered the only definitive way of knowing the risk potential of a financial 
product is by transacting in it. Therefore, it is doubtful that this would be an 
economically approach across all products. 
II) Activity restriction or ring-fencing- This effectively requires the separation of 
payment system institution from those involved in OTC product amongst other 
shadow banking activity. However the short comings of this approach have 
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already been considered above in the analysis of regulatory measures taken to 
mitigate against the GFC peculiarity of market and product opacity. It is 
considered that this approach may be apparently appeasing to the society and 
possibly raise the risk and systemic risk consciousness of the managing bodies of 
banking institutions. However, the danger remains since this approach simply 
shifts risks of regulated banking entities to a new microcosm of shadow banking 
entities. Further, this microcosm still connected to the money market and thus still 
possesses a real potential of affecting the financial system and its liquidity. 
III) Conduct– This approach has also been considered above in the analysis of 
regulatory measures taken to mitigate against the GFC peculiarities. It is 
considered that the conduct of financial institutions may be revised to ensure that 
the risks related to certain originated OTC products are retained. However this 
would simply widen the net of systemic risk. Further given the dual feature of 
OTC products (risk mitigation and speculative rent yielding) this risk retention is 
unlike to dissuade the development and use of OTC products. Additional 
disclosure to include considerations of targeted customer suitability simply means 
that the known risks associated with such OTC products are passed on. As 
indicated above, the full risk potential of any OTC product cannot be fully realised 
until it is utilised in the market thus the full risks of any such OTC products are 
still not completely curtailed. 
IV) Consumer protection- It is considered that the implications of this approach are 
reflected in the first three approaches above.  
V) Transparency- The risk disclosure aspect of this measure is already considered in 
(iii) above. Clearing is beneficial since it included counterparty risk but again it 
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results in the transfers the risk to another microcosm of institutions that may in 
themselves in due course pose systemic risk to the financial system. 
 
It is noted that a running vein of the considerations above is the full appreciation of an OTC 
product and the full knowledge of the risks therein. The ultimate aim is to clearly identify 
what a ‘dangerous’ OTC product is. Since it is currently impossible to identify this on 
origination it is essential that any effective product regulation framework will need to be in a 
position to closely monitor the development, use and fully appreciate the risks resulting from 
the use of such products. This objective may be identified beneath the current product 
regulation framework of the EU.  
‘Article 40(1) of MiFIR provides that: ‘ESMA may where it is 
satisfied on reasonable grounds that the condition in paragraph 2 and 3 
are fulfilled, temporarily prohibit or restrict in the Union: the 
marketing, distribution or sale of certain financial instruments with 
certain features; or a type of financial activity or practice…….Article 
40(3), in making a prohibition or restriction decision, ESMA shall 
take into account the extent to which the action ‘(a) does not have a 
detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial markets or on 
investors that is disproportionate to the benefits of the action; and do 
not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage’127 
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Two issues are inherent in this: 
- How would ESMA effectively determine the detrimental effect of  financial 
product; and would it be able to do this before the such product has in fact been 
shown to be detrimental to the financial market 
- How would any alternative measure to the arbitrary language of the legislation 
above avoid regulatory complexity which has been identified as a systemic risk in 
itself? 
 
Perhaps the answers lay in addressing the complexity of OTC products. As identified in this 
work and on review of commentary on the issue of product regulation the potential danger in 
OTC products lies in their inherent complexity. In his article on regulating complexity in 
financial markets Schwarcz notes that complexities in securities can; 
- Impair disclosure since it ‘can deprive investors and other market participants of 
the understanding needed for markets to operate effectively’ 128 which thus 
‘increases the amount of information that must be analysed in order to value the 
investment with a degree of certainty’.129 
- Obfuscate consequences since ‘parties reviewing, or even structuring, the 
securities may not always appreciate all the consequences’130.  
- Further can make financial markets more susceptible to financial contagion since 
investors misunderstanding of how the products work leaves the market open to 
herding; and ‘securities also can contribute to contagion insofar as securities are so 
specialized and sophisticated that they have no actual or active trading 
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market…Absent market valuation,…………….a valuation procedure sometimes 
called ―marking to model.’131 
 
Therefore if the attempt to regulate financial product innovation is more appropriately 
targeted at simplifying financial products it would be more achievable and effective. However 
before delving into that it is essential understand why OTC products are so complex. 
 
The general understanding and in light of the comments above, OTC products are complex 
because their value is not only affected by the underlying physical asset but also the 
derivative aspect of its composition. This thus makes it difficult to determine its pay off. It is 
considered that this difficulty in payoff does not dissuade originators from creating it due its 
utility value in hedging transactions/arrangements. Avgouleas implies a correlation between 
high yield and OTC product when he notes that 
‘Commoditization of economic relationships and risk management leading 
to a dramatic soft of focus from long-term goals to transactions’ speed and 
volume in a drive to maximise commission income 132and short-term 
transaction based profit, a process often known as ‘financialisation’’133 
 
He further notes that ‘capitalism ………… favours short-term profit over long-term benefit; a 
trend that has been exacerbated by financialisation’.134 It is therefore considered the driving 
force behind the increasing complexity of OTC products is the pursuit of high yield rather 
than risk mitigation utility. Therefore it would not be detrimental to the market and the 
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financial system to structure financial product regulation by imposing simplicity 
requirements. It is considered that even if the less cynical view is adopted and the necessity of 
complexity is solely attached to the pay off as identified above, a simplification regime could 
still be feasible amidst the transparency regulatory framework.  
 
This forms part of the ultimate EU agenda on product regulation. The EU Commission has 
already proposed ‘a regulation which lays down common rules on securitisation and provides 
a framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisations (STS).135 On review it is 
noted that the simplicity requirement is satisfied if ‘the underlying exposure is transferred or 
effectively assigned to a [Securitisation Special Purpose Entity] SSPE….the underlying assets 
are not encumbered…the underlying loan is not in default’136. The transparency requirement 
is satisfied if ‘historical data on default and loss performance’ is made available to investors. 
Lastly, the standardisation requirement is satisfied when the originator of the product retains 
risk related to the product. On closer inspection it would appear these measures only relate to 
OTC products with loans as the underlying asset. At the heart of these requirements lie 
disclosure, clearing and risk retention, the inefficiencies of which have been discussed above. 
Furthermore these measures only seem to contemplate loans as underlying assets, not 
surprising since, as indicated above the regulatory motivation is crises averse to counter the 
cause of the GFC. Presumably OTC products may not have any other underlying asset that 
may cause a GFC? Furthermore these measures only seem to address the issues related to the 
underlying assets and this, it is considered, focused solely on the risk mitigation utility feature 
of an OTC product. As noted above the high demand and transaction activity surrounding 
OTC products spun out of control to result in the GFC not because of the high speculative and 
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yield seeking agenda of the market. It is currently unclear if these agenda of simplification 
will address this. It is considered that until the product regulation framework addresses the 
use of OTC products and not just their underlying asset risk the full breath of risks associated 
with them cannot be properly reflected and mitigated against. Notwithstanding this, it is 
considered that in light of the challenges to achieve product regulation the ‘simplicity’ agenda 
is a viable route but with some proposed changes. 
 
However it is acknowledged that the challenge of product regulation remains. Thus it is 
considered that the unavoidable way forward will be even more intrusion in the commercial 
activity of the financial institutions that make up the financial system. The expertise of the 
regulator must be amplified and a close working relationship must be fostered. It is 
considered this is the only way in which ESMA can feasibly achieve its mandate to 
‘temporarily prohibit or restrict in the Union: the marketing, distribution or sale of certain 
financial instruments with certain features; or a type of financial activity or practice’. 
 
3.2 A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD  
The Financial Conduct Authority in its aim to achieve good customer outcomes has 
considered and introduced measures aimed at making innovation work for firms and 
customers137. In a speech on this subject the Chief Executive of the FCA, Martin Wheatley, 
noted that as a result of GFC there are ‘questions over innovation in the market, new products 
or business models’138. Pursuant to this  
‘the FCA has been holding a series of roundtables with industry, as 
well as consumer groups, to provide a temperature check on emerging 
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concerns…..But the FCA is also now fast tracking thinking on 
……………three specific strands ………: on advice, on disclosure, 
and on market innovation.’139 
 
For the purposes of this work focus will be made on the market innovation initiative; ‘project 
innovate’. ‘A key objective of the programme is to make sure positive developments – ……. 
ones that genuinely promise to improve the lives of consumers or clients – are supported by 
the regulatory environment.’140 Such support would require  
‘FCA expertise to support innovators in two distinct ways….First, by 
providing help to firms who are developing new models or products 
advice on compliance so they can navigate the regulatory system. 
Second, by looking for areas where the system itself needs to adapt to 
new technology or broader change – rather than the other way round. 
On top of this, we will also be launching an incubator to support 
innovative, small financial businesses ready themselves for regulatory 
authorisation.’141 
 
Whilst it is recognised that the ultimate objective of this initiative lies in compliance, it is 
considered a valuable route to product regulation since this will inevitably develop the much 
needed market and technology expertise of the regulator. Since market and technological 
innovation lay at the heart of OTC product development it would serve a valuable tool at 
being better able to monitor and follow financial innovation and this keep up with regulatory 
measures to mitigate against inherent risks thereto. 
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CONCLUSION 
This work sought to bring the issue of effective product regulation to the forefront of the 
regulatory agenda amidst the regulatory position revision adopted following the GFC. 
Pursuant to this the scope and significance of OTC products has been highlighted as a driving 
force for economic development resulting from globalisation as well as a driving cause of the 
GFC. Therefore in light of the continued advancement of financial innovation and 
globalisation the issue of product regulation cannot be ignored if the regulatory objective of 
avoiding another GFC or indeed maintaining financial stability is to be achieved. 
Notwithstanding this truth the difficulty of the task is acknowledged but it is considered not 
impossible.  
 
It is considered that the concept of product regulation has indeed begun but further work is 
required to make it effective. Given the constantly developing nature of financial market 
activity and thus innovative OTC products the only feasible method to achieve effective 
product regulation is a culmination of close monitoring to achieve simplicity where possible 
but in any event ensure that financial products originated and distributed do not  
‘……… have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial 
markets or on investors that is disproportionate to the benefits of the 
action; and do not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage’142 
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